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This paper explains ~rhy riskier borrawers are often asked to pledge more
collateral in competitive credit markets. Four distinct measures af borrower risk
are developed and it is shown that they can produce conflicting rankings. Thus,
sta!ements about the association between borrower risk and collateral should be
inierpreted cautiously. However, sufficient conditions are derived under which the
aften-claimed positive relatio;iship between borrower risk and collateral is
s~,stained regardless of the risk measuc-e used.CdLLATET.2A:. A.~IL 80~d'H':ïi é2TSK
I. INtBODUCTIOtl:
Debt contracts ïrequently contain provisions requiring that borrowers pledge
collateral as a condition of lending. èterris (1979) reports that a Federal Heserve
Survey of the terms of bank Lending found that between 1971 and 1979, approxímately
IOi of all short-term and approximately 60Z of all commercial (and industrial loans)
by the 340 banks in the survey were secured. Despite its widespread use, however,
collateral has only recently been the subject of rigorous academic scrutiny.
Current attention has focused on a number of collateral-related issues, including
the pricing of secured debt and the role of collateral under asymmetríc information.
Absent from the literatuce, however, is a satisfactory explanation for the
widely held view among lenders that urisecured debt is a privilege reserved for only
the highest quality borrowers. Specifically, coimmn lending practice seems to
dictate that borrowers who are perceived by lenders as riskier are systematically
required to pledge more collateral than those perceived as less risky. Empirical
substantiation for this has been provided by Orgler (1970). Conventional wisdom
notwithstanding, there has yet to be developed a theory that establishes a positive
relationship between collateral and identífiable borrower risk.
We have two objectives. First, we wish to develop a model that explains why
riskier borrowers may be asked for more collateral. Second, we wish to provide a
word of caution. In the usual discussion of the link between collateral and
borrower risk, one is never told precisely what risk means. 1Je find that there are
numerous reasonable measures of borrower risk that lead to conflieting rankings.
Thus, a borrower regarded as riskier using one measure may be regarded as less risky
using another measure. This suggests that more careful empirical researeh is called
for in the future to further clarify the sense in which borrowers who pledge morecollateral are riskier.
iJhen discussing collateral, a distinction must be made between two different
types of collateralized Loan contracts -- those contracts that require that a
eorporate borrower pledge its own business assets as collateral to a particular
lender, and those eontracts that require that assets in wt~ich the lender would not
otherwise have a claim be pledged as collateral (e.g. an entrepreneur who pledges
his house as a collateral for his company's loan). 1Jith a few exceptions (see
Smith-1Jarner (1979) and Stulz-Johnson (1983)), most of the literature has been
devoted to the latter case. We too will limit our attention to this case. In one
of tlie fírst papers to consider the issue of collateral, Barro (1976) focused on
pricing issues whett collateral value was stochastic. However, this was not a
competitive equilíbrium analysis and it was silent on the relationship between
borcower risk and collateral. Much of the subsequent literature has emphasi2ed the
problem of informatíon asymmetry between borrower and lender.
At least four recent papers emphasize the sorting role oE collateral in a
marketplace characterized by differentially informed participants. Besanko-Thakor
(1987a) examine the role of collateral in solving the credit rationing problem when
lenders do not know borrowers' default probabilities. They conclude that collateral
has a useful sorting role in a competitive equilibríum and may mitigate ratiociing
when endowment constraints are not binding. In a second paper, Besanko-Thakor
(1987b) study loan contracting under asymenetric information within a
multidimensional pricing scheme which includes loan quantity, interest rate,
collateral and the possibility of rationing. In both papers, Besanko-?hakor find a
negative relationship between collateral atid borrower risk (i.e., high risk
borrowers put up less collateral than low risY borrowers.) lwo other papers examine
collateral when collateralization is costly. Both Chan-Kanatas (1985) and Bester
2(1985) conclude that costly collateralization can produce sorting of borrower types
essentially because collateralization costs create different marginal rates of
substitution among borrowers, encouraging low risk borrowers to pledge more than
high risk borrowers. Apart fcom the fact that these papers do not explain the
posítive association between collateral and risk, they also have nothing to say
about the relationship between identifiable risk and collateral since they are
concerned only with borrowers within an a yriori indistinguishable risk class.
In another recent paper, Chan-Thakor (1987) consider a model with moral hazard,
private information and collateral. However, in a setting similar to ours -- banks
compete for both loans atid deposits -- they find that all borrowers will use the
maximum amount of collateral. This is because they assume the deployment of
collateral is costless and íts availability unlimited. We avoid that result by
assuming that the bank incurs a dissipative cost in taking possession of and
liquidating collateral.
Stiglítz-Weiss (1981) hypothesize a somewhat different relationship between
collateral and borrowec risk. They assume that wealthier individuals are better
able to put up collateral and are likely to be less risk averse than poorer
individuals. This results in an adverse selection effect such that increasing
collateral makes both the average and the marginal borrower riskier. However,
borrowers are assumed observationally identical. Consequently, Stiglitz-Weiss do
not explain why there exist loan contracts that vary across borrowers with
observatíonally distinguishable levels of risk such that high risk borrowers pledge
more collateral than low risk borrowers.
While the assumption of informational asymmetry is appealing, it seems
unrealistic in its extreme form. Lenders are not completely powerless in
identifying differences in borrower quality. Indeed, most Lenders expend
3signifícant resources on credit analysis for just that purpose. Information
produced during the pcocess of credit analysis is used to systematically match
borrowers with appropriately written loan contracts.
ln keeping with this practice, re avoid the extreme characterization of
pre-contract indistinguishability by assuming that lenders can distinguish ex ante
beiween borrowers of different quality. Specifically, lenders know the probability
distribution of any borrower's project retu~~, conditional on a given level of
borrower effort. However, lenders cannot observe borrower effort ex post; this ís
privately known to the borrower. Hence, there is moral hazard.
Credit contracts are designed to cope with this moral hazard in a manner
consistent rith the bank's role as a perfect competitor foc loans and for deposits.
In particular, collateral, whose use is constrained by the bank's cost in taking
possession of it from a delinquent borc-ower, is a powerful instrument in dealing
with moral hazard. In this environment, we characterize sufficient conditions under
which more collateral is pledged by a borrower with higher risk regardless of how
this risk ís measuced.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the basic
model and delineates the general assumptions. Section III presents four measures of
borrower risk and discusses how they could produce conflicting rankings. The full
information (first best) solution is in Section IV. In Section V, the second best
solution is obtained and the stylized fact regarding the relationship between
collateral and bocrower risk is explained. Finally, Section VI concludes.
II. MODEL AND GENEiUL ASSUHPTIONS:
We assume univec-sal risk neutrality and view banks as competing for both loatis
and deposits in a perfectly competitive credit market. Deposits are assumed to be
elastically supplied at tlie riskless rate. These assumptions have three
4implications: (i) the bank's depositors receive an expected return equal to the
riskless rate, (ii) borrower's expected utilities are maximized subject to
informational and breakeven constraints, and (iii) banks earn zero expected
profits. Vithout any loss of generality. we assume that deposit insurance is (de
facto) eomplete and that banks hold zero capital. Thus, the bank's deposit funding
cost is the riskless rate.
The economy lasts for one period; there are two points in time, an initial point
t-0 and a terminal point t-2. At t-0, the borrower can invest one dollar in a
point-input, point-output project. The borrower has no initial wealth endowment to
permit the project to be self-financed. Thus, a bank loan must be sought. The
project yields a terminal payoff with a"two spikes~ distribution. That is, the
project pays :E íf successful and zero if unsuccessful. the probability of success,
p(6,a), for any project depends on its quality, 8, and the borrower's choice of
action, acA, where A is a feasible set of actions for the borrower. We let 6
vary cross-sectionally in (B, G} with p(B~a) ~ p(G~a) ~í acA, and every
borrower's 8 is coimrwn lmowledge. A borrower with 9-B will be called "bad" acid
one with A-G wi11 be called "good."
Throughout the ensuing analysis, we shall refer to the good borrowers as ~high
quality" borrowers and ttie bad borrowers as "low quality~ borrowers even though the
former are not necessarily less risky than the latter under all possible definitions
of risk. The borrower's action choice is ex post unobservable to the lender.
For simplicity, we assume A-[a, a}, with 0 ~ a ~ a ~ m and
p(a~6) ~ p(á~6)11 6. Choosing either a or á is costly for the borrower. The
cost of choosing an action a is V(a) ~ 0, with V(a) ~ V(á) ~ m.l Lle assume that
a choice of a-0 yields p(0~9) - 0 d 9. Since this is equivalent to not
investing in the project, we will let the borrower's feasible set of actions be
5A, although it is to be understood that autarky is a possibility. èloreover, we
analyze a generalized vet'sion of our model in the Appendix where we allow a
continuum of action choices and a continuum of quality parameter values, 8.
The Loan contract desígned by the bank consists of an interest factor (one plus
the loan interest rate), n~ 1, and a collateral requirement, C ~ 0. Each
borrower is assvmed to have unconstrained access to collatecal.2 This should Tiot
be víewed as a situation in which the borrower has infiníte collateral-elígible
wealth. 41e merely wish to model a setting in which endowment constraints on
collateral do not ín themselves induce distortions. Thus, we are assuming that
there is a sufficient level of collateral-eligible assets so that the collateral
cocistraint for every bot't'ower is slack at the optimum. Collatet'al in our model is
viewed as consistitig of productively employed assets that are pledged to the bank by
the bot'rower. Examples are fixed assets such as real estate attd possibly plant a~td
equipment. Hence, liquidating collatet'al prematurely is costly Eor the borrower.
In fact, we assume that these costs are high enough so that líquidating collateral
to self-finance the pt'oject is an alternative the borrower never pcefers to a bank
loan. These assets are assumed to be legally distinct from the bocrowing entity
that is being financed with the bank loan, so that the lender would not have a
general claim against these assets if they were not pledged.
The borrower's choice of action is made after receiving a contract from the
bank. Since the bank is unable to observe the borrower's action ex post, the bacik
eannot write action-contingent contracts to eliminate moral hazard. Moreover.
because the borrower has limited liability and invests in a risky project, the
standard approach to eliminating moral hazard with agent risk neutrality -- have the
agent pay the principal a fixed amount -- will not work here with a pure interest
rate loan contract. Of course, the bank can ask the borrower to pledge a sufficient
amount of collateral so that the secured bank loan becomes riskless debt and mot'al
6hazard is avoided. In reality, however, due to regulatory and operating
eonstraints, banks cannot hold for a long period of time collateral assets acquired
from delinquent borrowers. These must De expeditiously liquidated and converted
into cash. Stich hasty conversion entails two types of costs. First, there are the
tcaiisactions costs associated with taking possession of and selling these assets.
These are non-trivial. Second, because many of the assets pledged are not highly
liquid and the bank must sell immediately, it will frequently be forced to absorb a
loss (relative to the asset's "true" value) on the sale of collateral assets.
Further, many assets are worth more to the borrower as integral components oE a
productive whole than they are to some other agent as individual pieces separated
fram the whole. Ue capture all of these costs associated with collateral Dy
assuming that the bank's evaluation of the borrower's collateral is a fraction B of
the bocrower's own evaluation, where 8 t(0,1). In general, B may vary
cross-sectionally, so that we may write B(A).
Ve now summarize the basic notation. For a good borrower, p(a~A - G) - h,
p(a~6 - G) - h, V(a) - V, V(a) - V, and for a bad borrower, p(a~0 - B) - g,
p(a~A - B) - q, V(a) - V, V(a) - V.
For each (observable) 8, the bank designs the appropriate credit contract by
solving
Maximize L(9) - p(axle)f8-o(9)1 - I1-p(ax~0)]C(8) - V(ax). (1)
[n(e),c(9)}
Subject to
p(ax~A)a(6) t (1-p(a~~8))8(A)C(A) i r (2)
axt arbmax [p(a~9)IH-n(9)1 - ll-P(aIe)]C(9) - V(a)}. (3)
ae[a,á}
rlhere r is one plus the riskless interest cate, and n and C are stated as
functions of the borrower's (observable) type. The objective of the bank, as
7captured in (1), is to maximize each borrower's expected utility, given an incentive
compatible action ax. Condition (2) represer.ts the (breakeven) constraint that the
bank should earn an expected profit on the :1 loan that at least equals what it must
pay its depositors. And condition (3) is merely the (Nash) constcaint that, in
designing its credit contract, the bank assumes that the borrower will choose its
expected utility-maximizing action in response to the offered contract. In writing
"this maximization program, we have assumed that R ~ r[min p(a~9)]-I. This means
e that the borcower's return in the successful state exceeds the maximum possible
interest-related repayment obligation even if the collateral pledged is zero.
A(second best) equilibrium credit contract is one that is a solution to
(1)-(3). In equilibcium, the constraint (2) holds as an equality, so that the
bank's credit contract maximizes the borrower's expected utility subject to the Nash
constraint (3) and the constraint that the bank's expected profit is zero.
III. BORROWER RISK WITH 240RAL HAZARD AND ER ANTE HETEROGENEITY:
In this section we explore different ways of defining borrower risk. In a
setting with both moral hazard and ex ante borrower heterogeneity, it is difficult
Lo theoretically pick one risk measure as the "best," although we shall have
something to say about their relative merits.
Risk tieasure 1: Borrower i is riskier than borrower j if
P(a~ei) ~ p(a~ej) V acA.
Risk Keasure 2: Let a~(9,) and a~(6.) be the eguilibrium action choices of i ~
borrowers with quality parameters 6i and Aj respectively. Then, borrower i
is riskier than borrower j if p(ax(8i)~9i) c p(a~(Aj)~Aj).
The essentíal difference between these two risk measures is that the first
measuce compares borrower risk, holding action fixed. Thus, iE both borrowers were
8to choose the same action, then one has a higher success probability than the
other. We may view this as an ex ante risk measure. However, from an empirical
standpoint, it may be difficult to separate two borrowers using this risk measure
because they may choose different actions. The second risk measure attempts to
rectify this by simply comparing success probabilities given eauilibrium action
choices, recognizing that these action choices will generally differ across
borrowers. We may view this as an ex yost risk measure. T`he following example
shows that these two risk measures can give conflicting rankings.
Illustration: Slippose there are two borrowers, i and j, each capable of choosing
fcom two actions, a and a, with p(a~6i) - 0.1, p(alei) - 0.9, p(a~8j) - O.g,
p(a~6j) - 0.91, 8(Ai) - 0.9, B(8j) - 0, R- 12 and r- 1.10. Also, each
borrower has an indivisible asset that can be pledged as collateral. This
asset is worth 0.5 to the borrower. Thus, the bank can either ask for no collateral
or collateral of 0.5. For both borrowers, V- Y- 8.1.
Clearly, risk measure 1 tells us that borrower i is riskier than borrower j.
Let us now solve for the equilibrium credit contracts for the two borrower types.
Consider the type-6, borrower first. If the bank does not ask for collateral, i
this borrower chooses a- a reRardless of what the bank assumes about its action
choice in setting the loan interest rate. Thus, the bank will set the unsecured
loan interest factor for borrower-Ai at 11, so that its expected profit on this
borrower is zeco. Now, if collateral is asked for, the borrower will choose
a- at (with at c(a, a)) if the loan interest rate is set under the
assumption that the borrower will choose a z at. But it is inefficient for the
bank to set an interest rate commensurate with a choice of a- a since such a loan
contract (with costly collateral) is atrictly Pareto dominated by the unsecured loan
9contract that elicits an action choice of a. (For a formal demonstration, see the
proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.) Thus, if the bank uses collateral, it will
set the Loan interest rate assuming a(self-confirming) borrower action choice of a~
Thus, the type-8i borrower's expected utility with a secured loan contract and a
choice of a can be computed to be 9.695 - Y. which exceeds 0.1 - V, which is its
computed expected utility with an unsecured loan contract and a choice of a. This
means that the type-8i borrower chooses a and its success probability in
equílibrium is 0.9.
Following similar steps, the type-6, borrower's expected utility from J
optimally choosing a in response to an unsecured loan contract (priced under the
assumption that a will be chosen) is 8.5 - V. It is easy to verify that this
borrower always chooses a even when offered a secured loan contract that includes an
interest factor based either on the assumption that a will be chosen or on the
assumption that a will be chosen. Thus, the unsecured loan contract is optimal and
the borrower chooses a, leading to an equilibrium success probability of 0.8.
ue see then that use of the second risk measure identifies the type-6j
borrower as riskier, in direct conflict with the ranking provided by the first risk
measure. Despite the rather specific nature of the example (and the violation of
the assumption that collateral is unconstrained), the message should be cleac.
Sanking borrowers by risk depends very much on how risk is measured.
A third risk measure can be proposed that encompasses both of these measures.
Risk Measure 3: Borrower i is riskier than borrower j if
P(a~ei) ~ p(a~ej) d a, acA.
This risk measure obviously avoids the possibility that risk rankings may change
depending on the credit contracts offered. However, a serious drawback of this
measure is that is is too restrictive and it may often be impossible to rank-order
10borrowers by using it.
An alternative risk measure is based on the variability of the bank's
equilibrium payoff.
Bisk Measure 4: Let ax(0k), nx(6k), and Ck(6k) be the equilibrium
action choice, interest factor and collateral requirement for the type-6k
borrower, k-i, j. Then the type-9. borrower is riskiec than the type-9,
i ~
borrower if vara(8i) ~ varx(9j), where for k-i, j,
YarY(~) - p(ax(9k)~ek)[n'(ek) - r]Ztll-P(ax(~)181c)]IB(6k)C~(6k) - rI2.
Note that this risk measure coincides with the 8othschild-Stiglitz (1970) notion
of increasing cisk. Since the bank's expected payoff is always r in equilibrium,
its payoff from borrower 8, represents a mean-preserving spread of its payoff i
from borrower 6~.3 Although the risk neutral bank in our model does not care
about this risk, we explain shortly that it may be relevant for federal deposit
insurers. Clearly, the ranking provided by this risk measure may conflict with
those provided by either of the previous three.
What is the motivation for each of these four cisk measures? Note that the
first three risk measuces are all based on the probability that the borrower will
make full repayment, i.e., there will be no default. This class of risk measures is
appealing in the context of our model because we have a two-state payoff
distribution with a zero payoff for the borrower in the unsuccessful state. To the
extent that we focus only on risky loans -- for which moral hazard causes
distortions -- the value to the bank of the payoff it receives (as collateral) in
the state in which the borrower's project fails is strictly less than the borrower's
promised repayment. Thus, the first three risk measures concentrate on the
likelihood of full repayment and ignore possible differences across different risky
11borcowers in terms of how much they pay the bank in the unsuccessful state.
Clearly, this is an unappealing approach to risk measurement from a theoretical
standpoint. However, in the banking literature that has asserted a positive
association between collateral and risk, it has been claimed that the most reliable
and relevant risk measure is the loan classification made by bank examiners (see,
for example, Orgler (1910) and 41u (1969)). Ehipirical support for this claim appears
in 61u (1969). 1Jhile there are possible many factors that affect a bank examiner's
assessment of loan risk, it appears that the most important factor is the Loan`s
default likelihood (see, for example, 41u (1969)). This apparently minimal
importance attached by bank examiners to possible collections by banks in the event
of default may be because examiners value collateral even lower than banks
themselves and view the role of collateral as a"safety cushion" in enhancing bank
safety to be rather small. This is also cotisistent with the bankers' statements
that collateral is much more important for its incentive effects than as a"safety
cushion" (see, for example, Hason (1919)).
If we are interested in explaining the stylized facts then, we should be
interested in a risk measure that corcesponds closely to the one employed in
empirical studies on the relationship between collateral and risk. This aPVears to
be risk measure 2(or the stronger measure 3 if it is capable of ranking
borrowers). The reason for presenting risk measure 1 is that it may appeal to some
on the grounds that it provides an assessment of risk based on purely exoaenous
factors and is indevendent of the credit instruments available to the lender. In
fact, this risk measure provides a way to make ex ante "quality" classifications.
Holding borrower actions fixed, it seems natural to classify a borrower as being of
higher quality if its project produces a higher expected payoff and has a higher
success probability. Sl~ch a borrower is also less risky using measure 1. Finally,
12the result in the self-selection models of Besanko-Thakor (1987a, 1987b) that less
risky borrowers select less collateral uses a risk measure that can be viewed as
belonging to the class defined by the first three risk measures.4
Bisk measure 4 is theoretically the most appealing. 1loreover, it should be the
risk measure most relevant for the federal deposit insurer (FDIC). Although deposit
insurance premia are not risk sensitive, regulators watch over the risk levels of
bank asset poctfolios.5 Hisk measure 4, which accounts for the bank's collection
from a delinquent borrower, is relevant for the FDIC because of the practice of
allowing banks in imminent danger of failure to merge with healthier banks.
Clearly, the assessed value of the net worth of the troubled bank -- a figure
affected by the value of the bank's collections from delinquent borrowers -- is an
important statistic in this transaction.
Our objective in discussing these four risk measures has not been to provide an
exhaustive listing, but rather to point out that any statements about observed
cross-sectional relatioitships between borrower risk and collateral requicements
should be interpreted with care since the observations are very sensitive to the
risk measures employed. And it is far from clear precisely which risk measure is
being referred to in the popular claim that riskier borrowers pledge more
collateral.
IV. THE FULL INFORMATION SOLUTION:
The assumptions made about the dependence of the success probability on the
borrower's chosen action and type can be summarized as
h i h, q ~ g: h~ q, h i g. (Al)
We are assuming, therefore, that the good borrowec has a higher success probability
than the bad borrower for any given action. This implies that the maximum possible
improvement in the success probability for the good borrower -- due to a higher
13action choice -- is smaller than that for the bad borrower. It seems reasonable to
extend this implication by assuming that the marginal impact of action on a
borrower's success probability is decreasinR in borrower quality. That is, we assume
P(a(B) - P(a~B) ~ P(a~G) - P(a~G)
or q- g~ h- h. (A-2)
The lower marginal return to action foc good borrowers makes them less willing
to choose a. That is, quality and action may be viewed as being partially
substitutable, and a Likely first best solution is one in whích the good borrowers
choose a and the bad borrowers choose a. We will base our analysis on the
co~iditions that guarantee this first best equilibrium.ó The conditions follow
directly from the atialysis below and are stated as assumptions (A3) and (A4).
Henceforth, we shall assume for simplicíty that B(6) - B d 6.
Now, a first best equilibrium results if borrowers self-finance their projects.
With self-financing, a borrowec chooses a to
maximize p(a~6)R - V(a) - r.
ac(a, á} (4)
Note that the borrower maximizes the value of the project to it net of the S1
investment compounded for a period at the riskless interest factor. It is easy to
see now that a is optimal for the good borrower if
hR - Y- r~ hR - V- r,
which implies
h - h ~ (V - V]R-1. (A3)
It also follows readily that a is optimal for the bad borrower if
gR - V- r ~ qR - V- r,
which implies
q- q~ IV - V]R 1. (A4)
14It is straightforward to verify that (A3) and (A4) are compatible with (A1) and (A2).
V. ANALYSIS UNDER TtORAL HAZARD:
In this section, we will derive the solution to the constrained optimization
program stated in (1)-(3) and analyze its properties. Parametric assumptions
(A1)-(A4) will be maintained throughout.
PROPOSITION 1: Ttie Pareto optimal second best equilibrium contracts are as follows:
(a) For good borrowers, there is a unique equilibrium in which each borrower is
offer~d an unsecured loan contract. That is,
a'(G)í - rfh]-1.
(S)
(b) For bad borrowers, there are three possible equilibria. One is a secured loan
contract with a positive loan interest rate and the other two are unsecured loan
contracts. The secured loan contract is
aY(B) - r(91-1 - I1-qjBC~(B)(q]-1 (6)
Cx(B) - q~q } (1-q)0)-1~ (7)
where -1 - -1 4--IR-r[q} ) t(y-y)(q-g~ , This equilibrium with a secured
loan contract exists if
q - g ~ [V-V)[R - r(q}-1)-1
and q - g~ IY-V)R 1 t qR 11~qtOl1-q)}-1-1)~.
If either ( 8) or (9) fails to hold, the equilibrium credit contract will be an
unsecured loan contract with an interest factor




The solution stated in Proposition 1 demonstrates an important point. Whenever
the use of collateral is optimal, it always involves the lower quality borrower.
This observation is not an artifact of some of the specific assumptions of this
section. For example, our analysis of the continuous action-continuous state
u~variable case in the Appendix verifies this result numerically. The intuition is as
follows. Collateral has a positive incentive effect in terms of providing ihe
borrower a stronger incentive to choose a higher action in the second best case.
The reason is that the borrower loses collateral only when the project is
unsuccessful; hence, by choosing a higher action the borrower can reduce the
probability oE sucrenderiiig its collateral to the bank. Ideally, therefoce, the
baitk would like to use collateral for all borrowers. However, collateral involves a
dissipative cost because it ís worth less to the bank than to the borrower. Thus,
collateral should be employed only when its positive incentive effect more than
oEfsets its dissipative cost. Since the marginal impact of a higher action choice
on the borrower's success probability is greater for lower quality borrowers, the
beneficial incentive effect of collateral is also greater for these bocrowers.
Cocisequently, the use of collatecal is more efficient for the lower quality
borrowers.
This result apparently contrasts sltarply with the findings of recent articles
which examine the role of collateral in asymmetrically informed credit markets.
Besanko-Thakor (1987a, 1987b), Bester (1985), and Chan-Kanatas (1985) predict ttiat
hixher quality (lower risk) borrowers will use more collateral. The key difference
between those papers acid ours is that they consider pre-contract private
information. Borrowers have exogenously fixed payoff attributes about wlhich ttiey
lmow more a priori than do banks. Thus, based upon observable characteristics
alone, banks can make only coarse distinctions between borrowers, leading to each
observationally identical risk class consisting of borrowers with disparate risk
attributes. These models conclude then that, within each such risk class, banks
will ask for more collateral from those of lower risk in order to guarantee
incentive compatibility. In our model, the only informational imperCection is the
16Dank's inability to observe the borrower's action choice ex post. This gives rise
to moral hazard which is most efficiently resolved by having the lower quality
borrowers post mcre collateral.
It appears, therefore, that pre-contract pcivate information and nonpecuniary
moral hazard lead to different predictions about the relationship between borrower
quality and collateral. However, these predictions are not inconsistent with each
other since private infoc-mation considerations are relevant for explaining
collateral variations among borrowers within an observationally identical group, and
moral hazard considerations are relevant for understanding collateral variatioiis
accoss observationally distinct borrower groups. The pcivate infoc-mation effect
will predominate when observable characteristics are such weak signals of borrower
attributes that there is a very rich intraxroup heterogeneity among borrowers in a
given risk class. The moral hazard effect will be more pronounced when the marginal
effect of action on the borrower's payoff distribution is sufEiciently strong and
greater for lower quality borrowers. Careful empirical work should be able to
detect which effect is stronger in practice.
Thus far, we have only established that the bad borcowers put up more collateral
than the good borrowers. If we adopt risk measure 1, then we can say that there is
a positive association between collateral and borrower risk. But we can say little
about the validity of this observation with the other risk measures. Our final
proposition compares the two borrowers using all four risk measures.
PHOPOSITION 2: If q c h, then the low quality borrower is riskier than the high
quality borrower with risk measures 1, 2 and 3. If q i h, then the Low quality
borrower is riskier using risk measure 1, the high quality borrower is riskier using
risk measure 2, and no ranking is possible using risk measure 3. Finally, the low
17quality borrower is riskier than the high quality borrower using risk measure 4 if
r2[q)-1 t qll-9]QZ - 2(1-4]Qr ~ r2lhj-1 (11)
where - B - t [1--}0
I
Q (q q}- ~. If the inequality in (11) is reversed, risk
measure A will rank the high quality borrower as riskier.
Interestingly, an empirical study by Orgler (1970) found that bank examiners
classified secuced loans as riskier. This means that the "safety cushion" provided
by collateral in secured loans is considered inadequate on average (by bank
examiners) to offset the additional risk associated with the higher (equilibrium)
default probability of these loans. It is worth noting that such an outcome is
consistent with the prediction of our model. As Proposition 2 tells us, iE q ~ h
and (11) holds, then the low quality borrower -- granted a secured loan -- is
riskier than the high quality borrower -- granted an unsecured loan -- using all
four risk measures.
VI. CONCLUSION:
This paper has been an attempt to understand the relationship between borrower
risk and collateral in credit contracts that emerge in competitive credit markets
hampered by moral hazard. It has coimnonly been asserted -- both as a casual
empirical observation and as a finding of more careful empirical studies -- that
riskier borrowers pledge more collateral. We have pointed out that the definition
of risk celevant for such statements is somewhat elusive. Is a borrower riskier
than another if it has a higher default likelihood, ceteris naribus? Or is it
riskier if its default probability is higher, given the equilibrium credit
contracts? The issue is further complicated by the fact that, if an a vriori
riskier borrower pledges more collateral, then it also offers the bank a higher
payoff conditional on default and hence a possibly lower payoff dispersion across
18the default and no-default states.
To clarify these issues, we have proposed four different risk measures and
studied them in the context of a simple model in which borrowers take ex post
unobservable actions that effect the bank's payoff. The bank can indirectly contcol
borrowers' actions by asking for collateral; the higher the amount of collateral
pledged, the closer will be the alignment of the borcower's action choice with the
first best. However, the use of collateral is inhibited by the dissipative costs
faced by the bank in taking possession of and liquidating collateral. In this
setting we have characterized sufficient conditions under which more collateral is
posted by the riskier borrower, reRardless of which risk measure is employed to
identify the riskier borrower. Thus, we have an explanation for the finding of
empicical studies regarding the relationship between collateral and borrower risk.
This finding should, however, be interpreted with care. Our analysis also shows
that, even though it is the lower quality borrower -- the one with higher risk
ceteris paribus -- that posts more collateral, such a borrower ~ be regarded in
eguilibrium as being of lower risk under reasonable risk measur~es.
Our research in this paper can be viewed as making a twofold contribution.
First, we have rationalized an important empirical documentation about the l.'nk
between borrower risk and collateral in bank loan contracts. Second, our analysis
presents empiricists with the challenge of more carefully scrutinizing the data to
see whether the previously noted positive relationship between risk and collateral
is robust with respect to alternative measures of risk. In our view, it is this
latter contribution of our paper that suggests the most promising agenda for future
research in the area.
19FOOTNCTES
1. Bote that we are assuming that the cost function, V, does not depend on 8.
This assumption is common ïn many papers. See, for example, Boot-Thakor-Udell
(1981).
2. This assumption differs from that in Besanko-Thakor ( 1987a, 1987b).
3. Thus, borrower t3~ is preferred to borrower 8i in a second-order
stochastíc dominance sense.
4. In Besanko-Thakor (1987a, 1987b), there is pre-contract private information but
no moral hazard. Since borrower success probabilities are not alterable, the
ficst three risk measures coincide in their model.
5. See Busec-Chen-Kane (1981).
6. Analyzing such an equilibrium is interesting also because it has the potential
to Lead to a possible conflict in Lhe rank ordecings provided by risk measures 1
and 2.
20APPtNDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: Part (a): Good Borrower: Note from (A3) that a z a is the
Eirst-best action for the good borrower. iJe will show that the unsecured loan
contract in (5) produces a first best outcome and that there is no other unsecured
loan contract that can achieve the same outcome while satisfying the constraints of
the maximization program in (1)-(3). Once this is established, we will show that no
secured Loan contract can do better. Now. the óood borrower will choose a- a in
response to an unsecured loan contract if
hR - hn(G) - V~ hR - hn(G) - V,
which implies
h- h ~(V-V]R 1 t(h-h]R-ln(G). (App-1)
Note that, for any a(G) ~ 0, (App-1) always holds when (A3) does. Thus, the good
borrower will choose a- a. Note also that (2) is a binding constraint at the
optimum. The nx(G) in (5) can now be obtained as a solution to (2) when (2) holds
as an equality.
Part (b): Bad Borrowers
Since a is the first-best action for the bad borrower, there are three
possibilities:
(i) an unsecured loan contract is optimal and induces the first best action a;
(ii) an unsecured loan contract is optimal and induces the second best action a;
(iii) a secured loan contract with a positive interest rate is optimal and
induces the first best action a.
It is easy to establish that a secured loan contract that induces a can never be an
equilïbrium contract. To see this, assume there is a secured loan contract with an
21interest factor n and collateral requírement C i 0. Suppose, counterfactually,
that this contract is optimally designed to elicit an action choice of a and it is
an equilibrium contract in the sense that it satisfies the constraints in the
program in (1)-(3). From the bank's zero profit condition we obtain
n - Ir - BC(1-3)]l9]-1. (App-2)
recognizing that the battk's breakeven eomputation tntst, in equilibrium. be based on
the correct assessment that the borrower will choose a. Thus, the borrower will
prefer a to a if
qIR-a) -(1-q]C - V ~ g[R-n] - I1-g]C - Y
where n is given by (App-2). Rearranging (App-3) yields
IR - n t C] (4 - g] ~ Y- V.
Substituting for n from (App-2) gives
IR - r[s]-1 t Bcil-s}fs}-1 t c]lq-s] ~ v- v.




holds for C- 0. How, the borrower's equilibrium expected utility
will be
gIR - n] - I1-g]C - V.
llpon substituting for n from (App-2) and rearranging we obtain
g(R - r[g}-1) - Cll-B]I1-g). (App-S)
From (App-S) we see that the borrower's expected utility is strictly decreasing in C
and hence maximized at C- 0. Since the incentive compatibility constraint is most
relaxed and satisfied for C- 0, we have reached a contradiction and C i 0 cannot
exist as part of the equilibrium contract.
To guarantee that (6) and (7) emerge as the equilibrium contract. we need to
ensure that an unsecured loan contcact does not induce the first best action a;
otherwise, collateral would be unnecessary. Thus, a borrower mist choose a when
faced with an unsecured loan contract with an interest factor of n~(B) - rIq (the
22bank designs this contract expecting the borrower to choose a). This means we must
have
qIR - r(q}-Ij - V ~ glR - r(q}-1] - V.
Rearranging this inequality yields (8). ètote now that the level of collateral in
the equilibrium contract should be just enough to induce a choice of a. In Line
with our earlier demonstration, any higher level of collateral is inefficient.
Thus, we must have
q[R - n(B)j - I1-qlC(B) - V~ g(R - n(B)] - I1-g]C(B) - V. (APP-6)
?he optimal collateral Cx(B) is the one with which (App-6) holds as an equality.
That is,
Cx(B) - -IR - nx(B)] t [V - Y]f4 - g]-I. ( APP-7)
Now solving ( App-7) and ( 2) (as an equality) as simultaneous equations gives (6) and
(7).
Next, we obtain (9) as a necessary condition for (6)-(7) to be an equilibrium.
Note that for the candidate contract to be an equilibrium, the borrower's expected
utility with it and action a should exceed its expected utility with an unsecured
loan contract and action a. That is,
1(R - r~g)-11 - V ~ qIR - aa(B)) - I1-q]C~(B) - V, (APP-8)
r~here r~g is the interest factor for an unsecured loan contract that induces a
choice of a. Upon substituting for a~(H) and Cx(B) in (App-8) we get (9).
It is clear from these arguments that (6)-(7) cannot be an equilibrium contract
if (8) and (9) fail to hold. Suppose that (8) does not hold. Then, ouc previous
arguments show that the borrower will choose a even when offered an unsecured loan
contract with an interest factor of r~q. This will strictly Pareto dominate the
candidate secured loan contract. Likewise, if (8) holds but (9) does not, then the
23Dorrower's expected utility with a in response to an unsecured loan contract with an
interest factor ax(B) a r~g is strictly greater than it is with the candidate
secured loan contract. Thus, the equilibrium will involve an unsecured loan
contract with nx(8) - rlg. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: The only part of the proposition that requires formal proof
is that (11) is the relevant inequality for risk measure 4. To see this, note that
the bank's payoff in the (successful) state in which the bad borrower repays its
loan is
r(4}-1 - ll-qlB(q } tl-qló}-1~.
and in the (unsuccessful) state in which the bank collects the collateral, the
bank's payoff is
qó~q t II-q16}-1~.
The probability of success is q and the probability of default is 1-q. Similarly,
for the good borrower, the bank's payoff is rIh with probability h and zero with
probability 1-h. The inequality (11) now follows immediately from the definition of
risk measure 4. Q.E.D.
ANALYSIS OF THE CONTINUUH CASE:
61e will now generalize the model to include a continuum of action choices and a
continuum of values for 6. Thus, we have the following problem
17aximize L(6) - P(a~I6)IR - a(6)) - I1-P(ax~A)lC(6) - V(ax) (APP-9) in(e),cce)}
P(ak~9)a(9) t II-P(a~~6)]BC(0) ~ r (APP-10)
a~c argmax (P(a~e)IR - a(A)l - [1-P(aIe)]C(9)-V(a)) (App-11)
ae[0,1]
where 0c[0,1]. This maximization program does not yield closed form expressions
24for the vector of functions (ax(0), ak(A), C~(8)}. So, we will assume
specific functional forms for p(a~6) and V(a) and also some numerical values. In
particular,
p(a~6) - 8 t (1-9]a
V(a) - ka2,
where k is a positive, real-valued constant. Straightforward calculations yield the
following first-order optimality conditions
n~(e)-BC~(6) - [1-B]P(ax~9)[1-P(a~~A)](-P~(a~~6)'aa~~ênx(A)}-1. (APP-12)
P(axle)nx(9) t I1-P(at~8))BCk(6) - r (APP-13)
lP~(axle)R - Y'(ax)](P'(a~~9)]-1 z n~(6) - C~(A) (APP-14)
where primes denote (partial) derivatives. Substituting the specific functional
forms for p(a~0) and V(a) is (App-12)-(App-14) gives
n~(0)-BC~(6) - 2I1-B]k((1-ax}[1-6}-1 - (1-ak}2] (APP-15)
(6t(1-9}ax]fak(6}-pCx(6)] t DC~(A) ~ r (App-16)
a~ - (2k]-1(1-6]IR - n~(6) t C~(9)]. (APP-17)
Solving (App-15), (App-16) and (App-17) and defining t- 1-ax and
W - (1-[i](1-8], we get
2kwt3 - 2k12-8)72 - 2k[2B-11~ 1T t 2k[iw 1- 8[1-B]-1R - r. (APP-18)
This equation is difficult to evaluate without fucther simplifications.
Assume H- 7.5, 8- 0.75 and k-4. This gives
2(1-6]T3 - lOT2 - 16T11-8]-1 t 24j1-6]-I - 22.5 z r. (App-19)
We will now derive the first-best solution which is attained if the borrower
self-finances the project. That is, it maximizes
V - p(a(9)B - V(a) - r.
With the assumed numerical values and functional forms, we get
ao - 2I1-6]Hk - ll-B](15I16],
25where ao is the first best action. Thus,
To - I1-ao] - I1I16) t I15I16)8.
Substituting this first-best solution in (App-19) gives us (labeling A 3 0.5 as
~high quality" and 8- 0.11 as ~low qualíty")
(high quality)9 - 0.5 ~ LHS of (App-19) - 5.9155
( low quality)9 - 0.11 ~ LHS of (App-19) - 1.2225, (App-20)
where LHS means left-hatid side. èlote that in both cases, the equality in (App-19)
is violated assuming that rc(1, 1.15). Thus, the first-best is unattainable. It
is easy to see that the LHS of (App-19) is decreasing in t, and thus increasing in
ax. From (App-20) this implies that
~ ~
alow quality ~ ahigh quality.
Thus, as in the discrete case, the low quality borrower chooses a higher actíon in
equilibrium. Ue can also calculate the equilibrium collateral deployment across the
two types (choose r - 1.25).
Optimal Solution
Type a~ n~(6) Cx(6) p(a~~6)
High quality 0.3615 1.8043 0.090542 0.68075
Low quality 0.8357 1.2960 1.308539 0.8538
In this case we also get the result that the low quality borrowers pledge more
collateral. But although the low quality borrowers are riskier based on risk
measure 1, they are less risky based on risk measure 2. Finally, straightfonrard
algebra shovs that the second order conditions are met.
26REFERENCES
Robe. ~ ~ , u~rc.,; '...~ -... .-.~.."~et, Collateral and Rates of Interest," Journal of
r-~~~ -e~- -- l,.~.~, , November 1976, 439-56.
David Besanko and Anjan V. Thakor, "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in
Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," forthcoming, International
Economic Review, 1987a.
David Besanko and Anjan V. Thakor, "Competitive Equilibrium in the Ccedit Harket
Under Asymmetric Information," forthcoming, Journal of Economic TheorY, 1987b.
Helmut Bester, ~Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with lmperfect
Information," The American Economic Review, 75-4, September 1985, 850-55.
Arnoud Boot, Anjan V. Thakor and Gregory F. Udell, "Competitíon kisk Neutrality and
Loan Commitments." forthcoming, Journal of BankinR an4 Finarice, 1987.
Stephen A. Buser, Andrew H. Chen and Edward J. Kane, "Federal Deposit Insurance,
Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital," Journal of Finance 36-1, Harch
1981, 51-60.
Yuk-Shee Chan and Geocge Kanatas, "Asymmetric Yaluation and the Role of Collateral
in Loan Agreements," Journal of Honey, Credit and BankinR, February 1985, 84-95.
Yuk-Shee Chan and Anjan V. Thakor, "Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Horal
Hazard and Private Itiformation," forthcoming, Journal of Finance, June 1987.
John Hason. Financial HanaRement of Commercial Banks, Warren, Gorham ó Lamont,
Boston and New York, 1979.
Randall C. Herris, "Business Loans at Large Commercial Banks: Policies and
Practices," Economic Persnectives, NovemberlDecember 1979, 15-23.
Yair ~'. ~,"~ ~.e:r ; `",~ ~e ~dit Scoring Hodel for Commercial Loans," Journal of Honev.
CC~r.r;ï.----~-~ ~ar,,k:'....v, 2-4, Novembec 1970, 435-45.
Hichael Rcthschild and Joseph Stiglitz, "Inereasing Risk: A Definition," Journal of
Economic TheorY 2, 1970, 225-43.
Clifford W. Smith and Jerald B. Warr~ec, "Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal
Capital Structure: Comment," Journal of Finance 34, 247-51.
Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, "Credi'~ ~2atíoning in Harkets with Imperfect
Information," The American Economic Revíew 71, June 1981, 393-410.
Rene' H. Stulz and Herb Johnson, "An Analysis of Secured Debt," Journal of Financial
Economics 14-4, December 1985, SO1-22.
H.K. Wu, "Bank Examiner Criticisms, Bank Loan Defaults, and Bank Loan Quality."
Journal of Finance, XXIV, September 1969, 697-705.
271
IN 1986 REEDS VERSCHENEN
202 J.H.F. Schilderinck
Inlcrrv~~;i~innl Sl.rucl.urc ol' Lhe l?uropcan Community. 1'art 11I
203 Antoon van den Elzen and Dolf Talman
A new strategy-adjustment process for computing a Nash equilibrium in
a noncooperative more-person game
204 Jan Vingerhoets
Fabrication of copper and copper semis in developing countries. A
review of evidence and opportunities
205 R. Heuts, J. van Lieshout, K. Baken
An inventory model: what is the influence of the shape of the lead
time demand distribution?
206 A. van Soest, P. Kooreman
A Microeconometric Analysis of Vacation Behavior
20~ F. Boekema, A. Nagelkerke
Labour Relations, Networks, Job-creation and Regional Development. A
view to the consequences of technological change
208 R. Alessie, A. Kapteyn
Habit Formation and Interdependent Preferences in the Almost Ideal
Demand System
209 T. Wansbeek, A. Kapteyn
Estimation of the error components model with incomplete panels
210 A.L. Hempenius
The relation between dividends and profits
211 J. Kriens, J.Th. van Lieshout
A generalisation and some properties of Markowitz' portfolio selecti-
on method
212 Jack P.C. Kleijnen and Charles R. Standridge
Experimental design and regression analysis in simulation: an FMS
case study
213 T.M. Doup, A.H. van den Elzen and A.J.J. Talman
Simplicial algorithms for solvíng the non-linear complementarity
problem on the simplotope
214 A.J.W. van de Gevel
The theory of wage differentials: a correction
215 J.P.C. Kleijnen, W. van Groenendaal
Regression analysis of factorial designs with sequential replication
216 T.E. Nijman and F.C. Palm
Consistent estimation of rational expectations modelsii
21~ P.M. Kort
The firm's investment policy under a concave adjustment cost function
218 J.P.C. Kleijnen
Decision Support Systems (DSS), en de kleren van de keizer ..
219 T.M. Doup and A.J.J. Talman
A continuous deformation algorithm on the product space of unit
simplices
220 T.M. Doup and A.J.J. Talman
The 2-ray algorithm for solving equilibrium problems on the unit
simplex
221 Th. van de Klundert, P. Peters
Price Inertia in a Macroeconomic Model of Monopolistic Competition
222 Christian Mulder
Testing Korteweg's rational expectations model for a small open
economy
223 A.C. Meijdam, J.E.J. Plasmans
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Econometric Models with Rational
Expectations of Current Endogenous Variables
224 Arie Kapteyn, Peter Kooreman, Arthur van Soest
Non-convex budget sets, institutional constraints and imposition of
concavity in a flexible household labor supply model
225 R.J. de Groof
Internationale codrdinatie van economische politiek in een twee-
regio-twee-sectoren model
226 Arthur van Soest, Peter Kooreman
Comment on 'Microeconometric Demand Systems with Binding Non-Ne-
gativity Constraints: The Dual Approach'
22~ A.J.J. Talman and Y. Yamamoto
A globally convergent simplicial algorithm for stationary point
problems on polytopes
228 Jack P.C. Kleijnen, Peter C.A. Karremans, Wim K. Oortwijn, Willem
J.H. van Groenendaal
Jackknifing estimated weighted least squares
229 A.H. van den Elzen and G. van der Laan
A price adjustment for an economy with a block-diagonal pattern
230 M.H.C. Paardekooper
Jacobi-type algorithms for eigenvalues on vector- and parallel compu-
ter
231 J.P.C. Kleijnen
Analyzing simulation experiments with common random numbers111
232 A.B.T.M. van Schaik, R.J. Mulder
On Superimposed Recurrent Cycles
233 M.H.C. Paardekooper
Sameh's parallel eigenvalue algorithm revisited
234 Pieter H.M. Ruys and Ton J.A. Storcken
Preferences revealed by the choice of friends
235 C.J.J. Huys en E.N. Kertzman
Effectieve belastingtarieven en kapitaalkosten
236 A.M.H. Gerards
An extension of Kónig's theorem to graphs with no odd-K4
237 A.M.H. Gerards and A. Schrijver
Signed Graphs - Regular Matroids - Grafts
238 Rob J.M. Alessie and Arie Kapteyn
Consumption, Savings and Demography
239 A.J. van Reeken
Begrippen rondom "kwaliteit"
240 Th.E. Nijman and F.C. Palmer
Efficiency gains due to using missing data. Procedures in regression
models
241 Dr. S.C.W. Eijffinger
The determinants of the currencies within the European Monetary
SystemiV
IN 198~ REEDS VERSCHENEN
242 Gerard van den Berg
Nonstationarity in job search theory
243 Annie Cuyt, Brigitte Verdonk
Block-tridiagonal linear systems and branched continued fractions
244 J.C. de Vos, W. Vervaat
Local Times of Bernoulli Walk
245 Arie Kapteyn, Peter Kooreman, Rob Willemse
Some methodological issues in the implementation
of subjective poverty definitions
246 J.P.C. Kleijnen, J. Kriens, M.C.H.M. Lafleur, J.H.F. Pardoel
Sampling for Quality Inspection and Correction: AOQL Performance
Criteria
247 D.B.J. Schouten
Algemene theorie van de internationale conjuncturele en strukturele
afhankelijkheden
248 F.C. Bussemaker, W.H. Haemers, J.J. Seidel, E. Spence
On (v,k,a) graphs and designs with trivial automorphism group
249 Peter M. Kort




The reaction of the firm on governmental policy: a game-theoretical
approach
251 J.G. de Gooijer, R.M.J. Heuts
Higher order moments of bilinear time series processes with symmetri-
cally distributed errors
252 P.H. Stevers, P.A.M. Versteijne
Evaluatie van marketing-activiteiten
253 H.P.A. Mulders, A.J. van Reeken
DATAAL - een hulpmiddel voor onderhoud van gegevensverzamelingen
254 P. Kooreman, A. Kapteyn
On the identifiability of household production functions with joint
products: A comment
255 B. van Riel
Was er een profit-squeeze in de Nederlandse industrie?
256 R.P. Gilles
Economies with coalitional structures and core-like equilibrium con-
ceptsV
257 P.H.M. Ruys, G. van der Laan
Computation of an industrial equilibrium
258 W.H. Haemers, A.E. Brouwer
Association schemes
259 G.J.M. van den Boom
Some modifications and applications of Rubinstein's perfect equili-
brium model of bargaining
260 A.W.A. Boot, A.V. Thakor, G.F. Udell
Competition, Risk Neutrality and Loan CommitmentsVIWIV~~N~~~IWIV~HV~V~WV~I'IIII